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Considering the neuroscientific findings on reward, learning, value, decision-making, and
cognitive control, motivation can be parsed into three sub processes, a process of generat-
ing motivation, a process of maintaining motivation, and a process of regulating motivation.
I propose a tentative neuroscientific model of motivational processes which consists of
three distinct but continuous sub processes, namely reward-driven approach, value-based
decision-making, and goal-directed control. Reward-driven approach is the process in which
motivation is generated by reward anticipation and selective approach behaviors toward
reward. This process recruits the ventral striatum (reward area) in which basic stimulus-
action association is formed, and is classified as an automatic motivation to which relatively
less attention is assigned. By contrast, value-based decision-making is the process of evalu-
ating various outcomes of actions, learning through positive prediction error, and calculating
the value continuously.The striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (valuation area) play crucial
roles in sustaining motivation. Lastly, the goal-directed control is the process of regulating
motivation through cognitive control to achieve goals. This consciously controlled motiva-
tion is associated with higher-level cognitive functions such as planning, retaining the goal,
monitoring the performance, and regulating action.The anterior cingulate cortex (attention
area) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (cognitive control area) are the main neural
circuits related to regulation of motivation. These three sub processes interact with each
other by sending reward prediction error signals through dopaminergic pathway from the
striatum and to the prefrontal cortex. The neuroscientific model of motivational process
suggests several educational implications with regard to the generation, maintenance,
and regulation of motivation to learn in the learning environment.
Keywords: motivation, neuroeducation, educational neuroscience, reward, value, goal, decision-making, self-
regulation
INTRODUCTION
Since early theories of biological motives such as hunger, thirst,
and sex have been proposed, research on diverse aspects of human
motivation has been conducted to extend its conceptual bound-
aries and understand the dynamics of motivation. As a result, we
have major psychological theories on motivation including rein-
forcement learning theory, need theory, attribution theory, self-
efficacy theory, self-determination theory, expectancy-value the-
ory, achievement goal theory, interest theory, and self-regulation
theory. There is no doubt that these theories have contributed
in deepening our understanding of complex human motivation,
but it’s time for a new approach to overcome the fundamental
limitation of traditional theories.
Existing theories on motivation bear three limitations. First is
the vagueness of the concept of motivation. It is practically impos-
sible to draw a clear line between motivation and other concepts
such as drive, need, intention, desire, goal, value, and volition.
Due to this conceptual vagueness, it is difficult to come to a con-
sensus on whether motivation refers to an psychological state or
process, let alone the definition. Various constructs in different
theories of motivation are overlapping and often create confusion.
For instance, the vague conceptual distinctions between intrinsic
motivation and interest, self-efficacy and perceived competence,
value and reward, self-regulation and volition hinder effective
communication and constructive arguments on the identical
phenomenon of motivation.
Second limitation is the absence of comprehensive theory on
motivation. Although a number of theories on motivation have
been proposed, each one deals with only a specific fraction and
it lacks profound understanding of motivational process as a
whole. The measurement of motivation is the third limitation.
Action selection, frequency and persistence of the action, and
the degree of time and effort put into sustaining the action are
direct indicators of motivation. Although these measurements can
be obtained objectively through a long-term observation, due to
practical limitations, they are mostly conducted in the form of
self-report surveys on psychological constructs that are highly cor-
related with behavioral measurement. However, as motivation is
largely implicit and dynamic, the measurement relying on self-
report is very much restricted to consciously accessible aspect of
motivation.
Due to these limitations, extensive research on motivation so far
is yet to provide practical implementation into schools or work-
places. For effective motivational interventions, we need to set
a clear conceptual definition of motivation and come up with
a comprehensive conceptual framework that integrates diverse
perspectives. Measuring the brain activation pattern using neu-
roimaging techniques can be a complementary way of overcoming
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above-mentioned limitations. By detecting the changes in the
brain during task performance, it became possible to understand
the dynamic yet implicit nature of motivation.
I propose a tentative model of motivational processes which
focuses on the various stages of being motivated, based on con-
verging evidence in cognitive neuroscience, affective neuroscience,
social neuroscience, developmental neuroscience, and neuroeco-
nomics. In order to fully understand a phenomenon, it can take
more than a single unit of analysis which determines the level of
explanation. The more converging evidence from diverse levels
of explanation are provided, the more precise the understanding
of the phenomenon it becomes. The same goes for motivation.
Diverse units of analysis and levels of explanation coexist; from
microscopic molecular perspective to macroscopic socio-cultural
perspective. As shown in Figure 1, the unit of analysis draws the
distinction among different levels of explanation: neuronal level,
psychological level, and behavioral level.
The neuronal level of explanation describes the motivation-
related phenomena as functions of the ventral striatum involved
in reinforcement learning, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) region
linked to value judgment and decision-making, and the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) regions associated with executive function and cognitive
control. On the other hand, the units of analysis in the behav-
ioral level of explanation refer to the frequency and persistency
of the action, the degree of effort and engagement, selection of
approach and avoidance behavior, regulatory behavior, and so
on. The psychological level of explanation has mainly considered
constructs such as reward, expectation, value, goal, attribution,
competence, interest, and self-regulation as the primary units of
analysis. However, these are somewhat ambiguous and overlap-
ping psychological constructs which may not correspond to units
of analysis in the neuronal level. With the rapid advance in the
field of neuroscience, the validity and conceptual clarity of these
psychological constructs can be complemented by neuroscientific
evidence, and thereby the fundamental reconceptualization on the
psychological level has become active (e.g., Rangel et al., 2008;
Heatherton, 2011).
In this paper, I focused on pleasure, value, and goal as principal
units of analysis on psychological level because their underlying
neural mechanisms have been heavily investigated and relatively
well identified. I also try to propose a neuroscientific model
of motivational processes in which motivation is regarded as a
dynamic process and is understood as a series of detailed sub
processes of generation, maintenance, and regulation of motiva-
tion. I will explain the generation of motivation in terms of the
reward-driven approach process, the maintenance of motivation
in terms of the value-based decision-making process, and the reg-
ulation of motivation in terms of goal-directed control process
(See Figure 2).
GENERATION OF MOTIVATION: REWARD-DRIVEN
APPROACH PROCESS
ROLE OF REWARD
One of the most powerful variables influencing motivation is
reward, irrespective of reward type (physical or social reward).
FIGURE 1 | Levels of explanation and units of analysis on motivation.
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FIGURE 2 |Three sub proceses of motivational process.
The main function of reward is to induce positive emotions,
make the organism approach, increase the frequency of the tar-
get behavior, and hence prevent extinction (Schultz, 2004). As a
result, the organism looks for predictive reward signals, acquires
the stimulus-reward association, encodes the value of reward, and
decides on approach or avoidance behavior to acquire the sus-
tainable reward. However, the reward mechanism is not simple
when the associative learning via reward, reward-based decision-
making, and behavioral control to obtain future reward are taken
into account. The reward processing consists of a sequence of sub
processes such as anticipating the reward, associating reward with
behavior, planning to obtain the reward, encoding the value of
reward, and updating the relative value of reward. Thus, diverse
brain regions are recruited during reward processing.
The primary brain regions associated with reward is the
dopamine pathway widely known as reward pathway. Dopamine
is a neurotransmitter that is produced in the ventral tegmen-
tal area (VTA), passes through the globus pallidus and released
into the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) located in the striatum (See
Figure 3). This pathway is divided into mesolimbic dopamine sys-
tem and mesocortical dopamine system. Mesolimbic dopamine
system is where VTA neurons are connected to the NAcc, the
septum, the amygdala, and the hippocampus; and mesocortical
dopamine system is the linkage between the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), the ACC, and the perirhinal cortex. The mesolim-
bic dopamine system is responsible for reward anticipation and
learning, whereas the mesocortical dopamine system involves
in encoding the relative value of the reward and goal-directed
behavior.
The OFC, the amygdala, and the NAcc are the brain regions
that are consistently reported to be involved in reward process-
ing (e.g., Haber and Knutson, 2010). The DLPFC, the MPFC, and
the ACC are also reported to be relevant to reward processing,
but the primary functions of these areas are more to do with the
executive function in achieving the goal (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Walter et al., 2005). The OFC-amygdala-NAcc system responds
not only to primary rewards such as food or sexual excitement but
to secondary rewards like money and social rewards including ver-
bal praise or cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002; Kringelbach et al.,
2003; Izuma et al., 2008). In particular, the NAcc known as the
pleasure center is activated when a variety of rewards are antici-
pated or received. For instance, the NAcc is activated when people
were presented with favorite stimulus, engaged in favored activ-
ity, smoking, hearing jokes, and even when feeling love (Aharon
et al., 2001; Mobbs et al., 2003; Aron et al., 2005). In contrast,
several studies show that amygdala, which is known to respond to
conditions associated with fear and negative stimulus, is intensity-
sensitive not valence-sensitive (Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al.,
2003).
In case of primary reward, which is essential for survival that all
the species are automatically programmed to approach it, the ven-
tral striatum including the NAcc forms an association of behavior-
outcome. However, in case of conditioned secondary reward, the
OFC encodes and represents the associative value of reward, and
updates the value for future decision-making process. The OFC
is the critical brain region for value judgment (Grabenhorst and
Rolls, 2011). In particular, the medial OFC is reward-sensitive,
whereas the lateral OFC is punishment-sensitive (O’Doherty et al.,
2003). Tremblay and Schultz (1999) have discovered that the OFC
does not respond to the absolute value of the reward but it cal-
culates the relative value of the reward and respond only to the
ones with higher preference. This finding is in line with Premack’s
principle which states that reward is highly subjective and relative
and suggests that there is no such thing as universal reward which
goes beyond the individual characteristics and specificity of the
situation.
Social neuroscience research has discovered that both social
and physical rewards/punishments activate the same area of the
brain (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2009). In other words, social
rewards such as reputation, fairness, cooperation, and altruis-
tic behavior activate the reward-related network that is activated
when experiencing physical pleasure. Social aversive stimuli such
as social exclusion, unfair treatment, and social comparison acti-
vate the pain-related brain regions. These results suggest that
social reinforcement and punishment are as powerful and effective
as physical reward and pain. It is important to conduct neu-
roeducational studies to investigate whether social stimuli such
as compliment, encouragement, support, empathy, cooperation,
fairness, and altruistic behavior activate the reward pathways of
children and adolescents, and to design a learning environment
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FIGURE 3 | Key brain regions related to motivational process.
that allows sustainable activation of reward pathways. Based on
these findings on how bullying, normative grading, competition,
discrimination, punishment, and penalty systems at schools are
affecting the students’ brain development, we can suggest possible
solutions to minimize these demotivating features of the learn-
ing environment. Kim et al. (2010), for example, conducted a
study where learners were given feedback on their performance
in the form of absolute assessment and relative assessment, and
their brain activation patterns were compared during feedback.
The result showed that when relative assessment was given to low
competence learners, the amygdala, a brain region associated with
negative emotions, was activated even if the feedback valence was
not negative. This suggests that relative assessment should be used
with caution, especially for learners with low competence, because
it produces negative affect regardless of their actual performance.
One important issue in relation to reward is the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. If intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation are different constructs, is it possible to biologically
distinguish them and find dissociable neural mechanisms under-
lying each type of motivation? No neuroscientific evidence has yet
been found to support this claim. Moreover, it is quite common
that extrinsic and intrinsic value for a specific behavior coexists.
Since each reward has specific value which is subjectively com-
puted, whether the source of the value is internal or external may
not carry any significant meaning in value computation process.
People are motivated to behave to obtain desirable outcomes,
and also to avoid negative consequences. But under rapidly chang-
ing circumstances where the consequence of the action is uncer-
tain, a decision has to be made whether to stick to one’s current
strategy or to look for new alternatives. The trade-off between
these two options is known as exploration-exploitation dilemma
in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In exploratory
learning where new alternatives are sought, both the frontopolar
cortex and the intraparietal sulcus responsible for value judg-
ment and inference are activated (Daw et al., 2006). On the other
hand, in exploitative learning where habitual decision-making
occurs based on prior experience, the striatum and the MPFC
are activated. That is, the striatum and the amygdala are respon-
sible for approach and avoidance behavior respectively which
are modulated by the prefrontal cortex. According to the stud-
ies on brain development, the NAcc which is sensitive to reward
shows rapid development in adolescence, whereas the amygdala
that plays a key role in avoidance of danger shows rather slow
development, and the prefrontal cortex responsible for control-
ling of action shows the slowest development (Ernst et al., 2005;
Casey et al., 2008). Therefore, adolescents are likely to demonstrate
behavioral tendencies that are more close to exploitation than
exploration. This imbalance between limbic system and prefrontal
cortex in adolescent brain development provides an understand-
ing of impulsive, sensation-seeking, and risk-taking behaviors of
teenagers.
In the study on the sensitivity to reward, adolescents showed
greater activation in the NAcc while receiving the reward than
adults (Galvan et al., 2006; Ernst and Frudge, 2009), but the oppo-
site pattern was true while anticipating the reward (Bjork et al.,
2004). Additionally, in the adult brain, the OFC was activated when
the expected reward was not given (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).
This suggests that existing value system of the adult is probably
being updated to pursue successive rewards when the expected
reward is not given. Adolescents are known to be more sensitive to
rewards or positive feedback but less to punishments or negative
feedback than adults (Bjork et al., 2004). The comparison of brain
activation by age groups showed the differential activation pattern
in the DLPFC. For the children aged 8–9, it was activated when
positive feedback was given, whereas for children aged 11–13 it was
activated in response to both positive and negative feedbacks. For
adults aged 18–25, it was activated only when negative feedback
was given (Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). This developmental differ-
ence suggests that negative feedback for young children might not
be effective due to the slow development of the prefrontal cortex.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIKING ANDWANTING
The intrinsically motivated activity does not necessarily accom-
pany hedonic enjoyment. For example, although a soccer player
may have a strong intrinsic motivation to play soccer, sometimes
he may not feel pleasure during physical training or soccer prac-
tice. Spontaneous goal-directed actions are inherently motivated,
but instrumental actions to achieve a goal can be temporarily
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unpleasant. The new contention that pleasure and enjoyment are
not sufficient conditions for intrinsic motivation has been gain-
ing recognition. According to Berridge (2007), positive emotions
and intrinsic motivation do not coincide all the time and they are
operated by different physiological mechanisms. In other words,
the persistent approach behavior toward a specific stimulus does
not necessarily mean that the stimulus is favored. Berridge and
Robinson (2003) suggested that reward has two values; hedonic
value reflecting the degree of liking and incentive value reflect-
ing the degree of wanting. Whereas “liking” is a passive state in
which the quality of the stimulus is evaluated after being processed,
“wanting” is an active state where stimulus is pursued before being
processed. Wanting is not a state of desire like drive or craving,
but a process that a specific stimulus embodies attractive value on
the sensational or cognitive level. In order to distinguish “want-
ing” from its commonsensical meaning, it is often referred to as
incentive salience.
Olds and Milner (1954) conducted a seminal experiment on
the function of NAcc known as the pleasure center using a Skin-
ner box. An electrode connected to a lever was implanted in the
NAcc of a rat so that the NAcc was stimulated whenever the rat
pressed the lever. They observed that the rat continuously pressed
the lever without eating to stimulate the NAcc until it became
totally exhausted. As it was impossible to conduct a self-report to
verify whether the rat actually liked the electrical stimulation, a
new method of measuring the emotion was needed. One widely
used method of measuring pleasure or pain in infant or animal
studies is to analyze the specific pattern of facial expressions in
response to various kinds of taste, which is a universal indica-
tor of emotions across species (Berridge, 2000). An animal study
demonstrated that the NAcc of a rat was activated by drugs such as
cocaine but its facial affective expression in response to the drugs
was a disliking reaction (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991). This may
in part explain why drug addicts constantly want the drug but
they do not actually like it. Berridge (2003) also revealed that the
brain regions responsible for liking and wanting are anatomically
separated within the NAcc. These findings support the notion
that persistent action to obtain specific stimulus is not necessarily
pleasure-seeking one and wanting can occur without liking. By
contrast, liking without wanting can be found in a study where the
release of dopamine is suppressed by lesions or dopamine antago-
nists. In this case, no wanting behavior toward reward was shown,
but there was no decrease in the degree of liking for the reward
(Berridge and Robinson, 2003). Hence, it can be concluded that
dopamine plays a key role in wanting the stimulus and increasing
incentive salience, but it does not affect the liking for the stimulus.
Theories of intrinsic motivation and interest posit that people
are intrinsically motivated to persistently engage in the activity
when they experience pleasure and enjoyment (Csikszentmihalyi,
2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Hidi and Renninger, 2006). However,
if “liking” and “wanting” are dissociated, motivation is not gener-
ated by feeling pleasure or liking the activity without wanting or
incentive salience. This means that a state of liking for a specific
object or activity cannot be understood as a motivational state and
that liking is not a prerequisite for generating motivation. From
this perspective, liking refers to an emotional state whereas want-
ing has more to do with motivation and decision utility (Berridge
and Aldridge, 2008). There is a need for careful reconsideration
for the argument in which the school activity should be enjoyable
to generate motivation because pleasure and enjoyment may not
automatically lead to motivation. Hence, the transition from liking
to wanting and the relationship between motivation and emo-
tion remain an important issue. Moreover, applying the aversive
conditioning to behavior modification, which makes undesirable
behavior less attractive, has to be cautiously examined because the
assumption that people like their habits may be wrong.
Another new hypothesis about the function of NAcc is that
dopamine plays a role in effort-related behaviors. The traditional
hypothesis that dopamine is associated with the reward function
has recently been criticized. These criticisms are based on the find-
ing that the NAcc dopaminergic system is not involved in the
pleasure relevant to the positive reinforcement, but is responsible
for behavioral activation and effort-related functions (Salamone
et al., 2007). An animal study on the effect of dopamine dosages
demonstrated that dopamine depletion caused longer response
time and severe deterioration in high-effort task performance.
Also, rats with insufficient dopamine are prone to choose tasks
requiring less effort over tasks requiring much effort (Salamone
et al., 2005). According to these studies, the NAcc dopaminergic
system may modulate the effort regulation rather than reward-
related function. The brain regions associated with effort-based
decision-making include an extensive circuit from the thalamus,
the amygdala, and the ACC to the prefrontal cortex, but the NAcc
is the key area to interact with these areas.
MAINTENANCE OF MOTIVATION: VALUE-BASED DECISION
PROCESS
REWARD PREDICTION ERROR AND LEARNING
No motivation is sustained without learning and memory.
Approach-avoidance behaviors are learned and goal-directed
behaviors depend on working memory. Because remembering
actions that result in positive or negative outcome is beneficial
in adaptation, stimulus-action-outcome association is learned and
actions become habitual and automatic. Dopamine is known to be
mainly associated with reward and pleasure, but it is a neurotrans-
mitter that also plays an important role in motor performance,
conditioning, learning, and memory (Wise, 2004). Insufficient
dopamine causes stiffness and paralysis seen with patients with
Parkinson’s disease, whereas excessive dopamine may result in
behavioral disorders such as schizophrenia, impulse control disor-
der, ADHD, and addiction. After being injected with dopamine as
treatment for Parkinson’s disease, the patients showed a marked
increase in the compulsive behaviors such as excessive gambling
or eating disorders (Dagher and Robbins, 2009). Functional dis-
orders associated with excessive dopamine are not being able to
control the dominant motor response, focusing more on gains
than losses, making hasty and risky decisions, favoring small but
immediate reward and so on.
According to reinforcement learning theory, the magnitude
of learning depends on the dopamine release (Montague et al.,
1996). Both positive reinforcement accompanying appetitive stim-
uli and negative reinforcement removing aversive stimuli increase
dopamine release, which in turn increases the frequency of the
target behavior and leads to associative learning between stimuli
www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 98 | 5
Kim Neuroscientific model of motivation
and behavior. Through repeated association with neutral stim-
uli (environmental stimulus or psychological state), the powerful
association of stimulus-action-outcome is learned. The initial
reward for a chosen action is most likely unpredictable, so the
effect of the reward is maximized. This difference between the
expected and the actual reward is referred to as reward predic-
tion error (RPE), which is encoded by dopaminergic neurons. The
larger the RPE is, the more dopamine is released. In a study con-
ducted by Schultz et al. (1997), they examined the response of a
single dopamine neuron. At an early stage of learning when the
chimpanzee did not expect a reward, dopamine neuron was acti-
vated while receiving reward. However, when a reward was always
anticipated due to repetition, the dopamine neuron was activated
only when cues for the reward were given, and it was not actually
activated while receiving the reward. On the contrary, when the
expected reward was not given, dopamine neuron was suppressed.
This shows clearly that it takes only anticipation for the reward,
through various conditioned stimuli associated with reward or
punishment, not the reward itself, to boost the dopamine release
and hence to generate the target behavior. This is a very beneficial
way of learning from the perspective of adaptation.
There are two types of RPE: positive and negative RPE (Schultz,
2006). Positive RPE is generated when the outcome is better-than-
expected or unexpected rewards are given, whereas negative RPE is
generated when the outcome is worse-than-expected or expected
rewards are omitted. The larger the positive RPE, the bigger the sur-
prise, hence maximum learning occurs. Repeated use of rewards,
however, increase the expectation of reward at all times reducing
positive RPE, so it reaches an asymptote (close to zero) without
learning gains. For this reason, the typical learning curves are neg-
atively accelerated, indicating that rapid growth occurs at early
stages of learning but this increment gets smaller on later stages.
To maintain students’ motivation for target behavior, a cer-
tain amount of dopamine should be released during or after the
pursuit of the target behavior. The dopamine can be released by
the positive RPE whenever the unexpected positive outcomes are
given. At this point, a specific action is sustained as long as the
outcome of a habitual action is satisfactory. In order to maximize
the learning, it is essential to provide relatively new reinforce-
ments to increase positive RPE. It is highly consistent with interest
theory which posits the importance of providing the unexpected
stimuli which can be easily resolved later, such as novel or sur-
prising stimuli with cognitive gap or conflict (Berlyne, 1974; Kim,
1999). However, one of the dilemmas among educators is that any
kind of learning requires practice through repetition which usually
undermines the motivation. Thus, if the instructors cannot help
but repeat the learning material, then they should introduce a new
learning activity or novel learning context in order to produce
positive RPE.
The clear example of the motivation-learning link is addic-
tion. Excluding serious malfunctions in controllability, an addicted
behavior is not only the most powerfully motivated action but
also the result of maximum learning. Once the cue-reward asso-
ciation is learned, the role of the cues to activate the dopamine
system grows, but the role of reward itself gets smaller. That is
because the brain has a strong tendency to reduce dopamine release
when the reward is expected (Self, 2003). However, in the case
of psychoactive substances such as alcohol or cocaine, dopamine
is excessively released without the typical learning process. As a
result, extreme memory or pathological learning is induced to rec-
ognize these substances as new and salient rewards (Hyman et al.,
2006). This explains why it is difficult to break the drug addic-
tion and why only a single exposure can lead to a relapse even
after a long period of abstinence. Behavioral addictions including
online game addiction which is common among adolescents, are
also reported to show a similar pattern to drug addiction (Grant
et al., 2006), but more systematic studies need to be conducted to
reveal the precise mechanism.
OUTCOME EVALUATION AND ACTION SELECTION
Numerous behaviors in everyday life are determined by the choice
from many other alternatives whether to continue or to stop a spe-
cific action. Action selection is a part of decision-making process
based on value assessment. The higher the assessed value of the
outcome from the selected action, the greater the possibility of
choosing it later. Rangel et al. (2008) distinguished three different
types of valuation systems which play an essential role in decision-
making process; Pavlovian, habitual, and goal-directed system.
Pavlovian system assesses values with regards to the salience of
stimulus. The network of the amygdala, the NAcc, and the OFC
is involved in this process. Habitual system evaluates the value
of stimulus-response association following the reward. The dor-
sal striatum and the cortico-thalamic loops are the main brain
regions for this system. Lastly, goal-directed system calculates the
association of action-outcome and evaluates the reward assigned
to other outcomes. The OFC and the DLPFC are responsible for
this process. Let’s take studying as an example of value-based
decision-making. Pavlovian system assesses the value of a spe-
cific school subject such as English, habitual system evaluates the
action of studying English vocabulary every morning, and goal-
directed system determines which subject to concentrate on during
vacation.
To make an effective choice, it is required to judge the potential
value of the action which reflects the probability of its desirable
outcomes. This is referred to as expected utility in economics and
psychology. The brain should calculate the expected value before
the choice is actually made. In an experiment where the magnitude
and probability of the reward were manipulated, the NAcc activa-
tion showed a positive correlation with the magnitude of expected
reward and positive emotions, and the activity of the MPFC had
a positive correlation with the probability of obtaining the reward
(Knutson et al., 2005). This finding indicates that the subcorti-
cal structure responds mainly to physical property and emotional
aspect of reward, whereas the prefrontal cortex is more involved
in the higher order computational function associated with the
probability of obtaining the reward. In case where unexpected
outcome is resulted from a choice, recomputation or update of the
value of the action is required. Hence, children and elderly with
low prefrontal cortex function tend to find it difficult (Brand and
Markowitch, 2010).
The OFC, a core brain region for value judgment and decision-
making, is also known as a reward-related region, but its role in
reward processing is not straightforward (Kringelbach, 2005). Ani-
mal studies have demonstrated that animals with OFC lesions were
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capable of normal reward processing. They were able to perform
actions to obtain rewards, learn the associations between stim-
uli and new rewards, and distinguish rewards from no rewards
(Izquierdo et al., 2004; Rudebeck et al., 2006). This indicates that
the primary function of OFC is to integrate every aspect of infor-
mation, calculate the value to expect the outcome of the choice,
and represent it in working memory (Montague and Berns, 2002).
According to the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio (1996),
somatic states related to various emotions, which were generated
during the process of evaluating actions, influence the final deci-
sion. The function of OFC in this process is to encode somatic state
associated with the environmental pattern and retrieve it to recal-
culate the value for future decision-making. A neuroimaging study
demonstrated that the OFC responded not only to sensory stim-
uli inducing pleasant-unpleasant odor and sound, but to abstract
reward and punishment such as making money and losing it (Rolls
and Grabenhorst, 2008). The OFC is in close connection with
adjacent prefrontal regions and constantly interacts with them to
search for more effective decision-making. More specifically, the
OFC calculates the value, whereas the DLPFC retains this infor-
mation to plan actions for the reward and the MPFC evaluates the
effort required to execute the plan (Wallis, 2007; Grabenhorst and
Rolls, 2011).
The function of OFC becomes clear when we take a close look
at the cases with OFC damage. The most famous case is Phineas
Gage who was working as a railroad construction foreman when
he was involved in an accident in which a metal rod was driven
through his head. He survived the accident and displayed nor-
mal cognitive abilities but he exhibited inappropriate behaviors in
social interactions such as erratic and impulsive behaviors. This
case drew attention as the first case to demonstrate the possible
relation between prefrontal cortex including the OFC and social
skills or personalities. Patients with OFC damage are not cogni-
tively impaired, but show severe defects in daily decision-making
and tend to exhibit obsessive-compulsive disorder, drug or gam-
bling addiction, and eating disorder (Camille et al., 2004). It is
also known that patients find it difficult to control emotion and
they do not usually experience regret (Camille et al., 2004). Feel-
ing of regret occurs when an individual compares the outcome of
current choice with possible alternatives, but patients with OFC
damage are thought to have problems with this counterfactual
thinking.
While conducting a gambling task, patients with OFC dam-
age persist in high-risk (low probability of winning) choices to
win large money at once and they ultimately lose all the money
(Bechara et al., 1994). This impulsive behavior is closely related
to the NAcc which is connected to the OFC. The OFC controls
the immediate response of the NAcc. If the NAcc is not controlled
due to the OFC malfunctions, it is difficult to suppress impulsive
behaviors. The suppressive role of the OFC controlling the NAcc
can be explained as a general function of the OFC, value represen-
tation and value computation. That is, the suppression of impulse
is a result of Go/NoGo decision based on comprehensive value
assessment. The OFC assesses the values on the expected outcomes
of each action and signals them. When the OFC is damaged or
underdeveloped, precise calculation of the value of specific action
is difficult and an impulsive action is more likely to be chosen.
Another behavioral characteristic deeply associated with OFC
damage is the difficulty of reversal learning (Schoenbaum
et al., 2007). In reversal learning paradigm, when contin-
gency of stimulus-reinforcement is altered, the new stimulus-
reinforcement association is learned only if prior response is
changed. However, a monkey with OFC lesion is not able to control
responses from prior reinforcement and exhibits perseveration,
although it cannot receive further reinforcement (Mishkin, 1964).
This is due to the inability to update values of prior actions through
negative feedback. Thus, the main function of the OFC is to cal-
culate and update the value of an action through learning new
stimulus-reinforcement association.
Unlike laboratory settings, reality poses many issues to con-
sider when making decisions because the outcome is uncertain
or risky in many cases. Therefore a precise representation of
value judgment is thought to be quite advantageous in suppress-
ing impulsive actions. Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that
opportunity for choice is desirable (Leotti et al., 2010) and the
anticipation of choice is also rewarding (Leotti and Delgado,2011).
For children or adolescents, however, whose prefrontal regions
including the OFC are underdeveloped, the lack of experience lim-
its the representation on values. Therefore, we need to frequently
inform them on utility values of learning, provide opportunity
to make their own choices, and enhance the quality of value
judgment.
REGULATION OF MOTIVATION: GOAL-DIRECTED CONTROL
PROCESS
How do people regulate their motivation? The reason people fail
to perform tasks persistently and give in to temptation is because
immediate rewards are highly favored over delayed rewards. Sub-
jective values of rewards change with the point in time when the
rewards are given and immediacy itself plays a relatively important
role. If we vary the time and the magnitude of the reward, offer a
number of options, and ask the participants to choose one, then
they experience a conflict between small but immediate reward
and large but delayed reward. One clear point is that as the reward
is delayed, the relative value of the reward is decreased. This is
called temporal discounting or delay discounting. Temporal dis-
counting is directly related to self-control (Rachlin, 1995) or delay
of gratification (Mischel and Gilligan, 1964), and is very similar
to resisting temptation or suppressing impulse in its nature. Self-
control and delay of gratification refer to the ability to select larger
delayed over smaller immediate rewards.
McClure et al. (2004) conducted a study to search the brain
areas associated with temporal discounting. They manipulated
various monetary reward options at different times (e.g., $20
today vs. $25 after 2 weeks) and compared brain activation pat-
terns during choice. The results showed that the striatum and the
MOFC were activated when the immediate reward was selected,
whereas the fronto-parietal cortex was activated when the delayed
reward was selected. This indicates that selecting the immediate
reward activates the reward and value pathway, but to delay imme-
diate gratification, the prefrontal cortex responsible for cognitive
control should be involved.
What makes people resist to temptation and control motiva-
tion to constantly pursue a specific goal? Controlling impulses
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and regulating motivation calls for a detailed planning and exe-
cution for future goals. The cognitive control is a central process
underlying such regulation, including goal maintenance, planning,
performance monitoring, strategy selection, and outcome evalua-
tion. Therefore, the mechanism by which the impulse is controlled
should not be understood as a mere suppression of desire, but it
should be construed as a goal-directed regulation by a cognitive
control.
Cognitive control is actually a very useful coping strategy
to modulate motivation to deal with negative RPE or negative
feedback. When it happens, the dopamine system becomes less
activated decreasing the frequency of target action, ultimately
eliminating the learned action. Emotional reactions to negative
feedback do no good to control motivation. Rather, one should
check for problems of the performance through cognitive control
and modify strategies. This may lead to better performance and
produce a positive RPE, which in turn stimulates dopamine release
to promote motivation and raises the chance of a new learning.
Brain regions associated with cognitive control process are
the ACC, the DLPFC, and the OFC (Cole and Schneider, 2007).
The ACC which is responsible for executive functions involves in
integration of cognition and emotion, attentional control, perfor-
mance monitoring, error detection, response inhibition, planning
of higher-level action, and strategy modification (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). The dorsal part of ACC, which is connected to the
DLPFC responsible for working memory, is involved in cognitive
functions. On the other hand, the ventral part of ACC is associated
with emotional functions (Bush et al., 2000).
Social cognitive neuroscience studies on delay discounting
found that individual variability in self-control has been due to the
difference in the working memory capacity (e.g., Shamosh et al.,
2008). From meta-analysis, Shamosh and Gray (2008) revealed
a negative correlation (r =−0.23) between delay discounting and
intelligence. Other studies also found that activation of the DLPFC
has a strong correlation not only with the working memory capac-
ity, executive function, and intelligence but with success rate of var-
ious delay of gratification tasks (Knoch and Fehr, 2007; Shamosh
et al., 2008). Delay discounting tasks require carrying out cogni-
tive and emotional control simultaneously while calculating the
value of selected action. Thus, individuals who are capable of effi-
ciently utilizing working memory have advantages. The DLPFC are
recruited during the goal-directed behavior and top-down regu-
latory processes, including goal maintenance, strategic behavioral
planning, and implementation of actions (e.g., Miller and Cohen,
2001; Tanji and Hoshi, 2008). Therefore, self-regulation can be
regarded as the process of encoding the value of the goal into
VMPFC to make goal-directed decisions and regulating them in
the DLPFC (Hare et al., 2009).
A study on brain development in response to negative feed-
back conducted by Crone et al. (2008) demonstrated that similar
activation pattern to that of adults were seen in the OFC for 8–
11 age group, and in parietal cortex for 14–15 age group, but no
activation was seen in the ACC and the DLPFC up until the age
of 14–15. As the DLPFC and the ACC are the regions associated
with cognitive control, no activation means that children and early
adolescents pose difficulty in reflecting the behavior and search-
ing for alternatives after receiving negative feedbacks. Because this
finding suggests that the effort to change the behaviors of children
through negative feedback might be ineffective, we need to develop
an appropriate feedback system for children and adolescents.
Because self-control is an important cognitive ability that
is linked to a wide variety of measures of academic achieve-
ment, it would be meaningful to develop self-control ability
through training or intervention program. Fortunately, a grow-
ing number of studies have shown that working memory training
improves cognitive control (Klingberg et al., 2002, 2005) as well
as several other cognitive abilities, such as fluid intelligence and
problem solving (Jaeggi et al., 2008). This suggests that improv-
ing cognitive controllability through working memory training
is likely to be far more effective in promoting self-regulation
rather than emphasizing the volitional power or boot camp-style
training.
AN INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON MOTIVATIONAL
PROCESSES
By integrating neuroscientific findings on reward, learning, value,
decision-making, and cognitive control, I propose a tentative
model on motivational processes (see Figure 4). In the motiva-
tional process model, motivation is defined as a series of dynamic
processes including generation, maintenance, and regulation of
motivation of which primary functions are approach toward
reward, learning through RPE, decision-making based on value,
and cognitive control for goal pursuit. These sub processes inter-
act with each other by sending prediction error signals from the
striatum to the prefrontal cortex.
First, the motivation generation process is the process in which
approach behavior is caused by the anticipation of reward. It
is a process of either determining approach/avoidance behavior
(Go/NoGo decision) or selecting an action among alternatives,
based on the reward value. The reason for a motivation being gen-
erated for a previously unmotivated action is because the reward
contingent upon a specific action increases the expectation for
the reward, which continuously causes approach behavior. The
generation of motivation can be judged by the frequency and
duration of the approach behavior. The ventral striatum and
the amygdala play a significant role in this process. Critical fac-
tors for the motivation generation process are incentive salience
and reward anticipation from past experiences. And the ene-
mies for this process are the punishment and high level of task
difficulty.
Next, learning through positive RPE is a process to continuously
maintain motivation. The stimulus-action-reward association is
learned to raise the possibility of acquiring the subsequent rewards.
When the reward is better than expected, the positive RPE occurs.
The larger the error is, the bigger the learner’s surprise becomes.
And the surprise leads to intense learning (Kamin, 1969; Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972). Engraved stimulus-action-reward association
enhances the value of a selected action and sustains the target
behavior. The negative outcome evaluation, however, wears out
positive RPE, which in turn reduces the effect of learning and
the value of an action. In the motivation maintenance process,
the positive RPE and value judgment are the crucial factors,
and experiences of failure and perceived costs are the enemies.
The sustaining of motivation can be measured by the frequency
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FIGURE 4 | Neuroscientific model of motivational process.
of the action selection, persistence, and efforts. The striatum
and the OFC are the main brain regions involved in sustaining
motivation.
Lastly, the cognitive control by the negative RPE is a process
of self-regulation in fail-to-get-reward situation to pursue goal-
directed behaviors and modify plans and strategies to explore new
rewards. When the expected reward is not given as a result of an
action, the value of the action decreases and the frustration grows
bigger leading to diminished approach behaviors, and other alter-
native actions become massively attractive. This temptation can
be resisted by successful cognitive control such as retrieving the
long-term goal, monitoring the current performance, establish-
ing a concrete plan, and selecting a new strategy. Motivations can
also decline when rewards are always expected because the posi-
tive RPE stops increasing. Even in this circumstance, motivation
can be promoted through the engagement of the goal-directed
cognitive control process of establishing a new goal, plan, and
strategy. The enemies for motivation regulation are the immedi-
ate impulse, the low executive processing capacity, and the lack
of specific goals and plans. Delay of gratification and goal attain-
ment are the barometers for motivation regulation. The ACC and
the DLPFC are the main neural circuits related to the motivation
regulation process.
A typical example of this motivational process can be easily
found in an academic environment. Consider a situation where
a student’s motivation to learn is generated, sustained, and reg-
ulated. A student with no initial motivation to learn a specific
school subject may form strong intentions to study the subject
for the first time in her life after being complimented or recog-
nized by a teacher (reward-driven approach). Studying harder
to get the teacher’s praise unexpectedly leads to a better grade
(positive RPE). As she already learned, through the association,
what actions to take to keep the good grade, she would put in
continuous efforts and be able to maintain the motivation to learn
to some extent (value-based decision-making). However, if the
grade no longer improves, no more compliments are given by a
new teacher (negative RPE), or she gets so used to the compliment
that the value of the reward starts to drop (decrease of positive
RPE), then she is likely to be in danger of falling for other tempting
stimuli. At this moment, by retrieving her long-term goal, she can
monitor her current state of performance, modify the plan, and
search for alternative strategies (cognitive control). As a result, she
can delay the immediate gratification and succeed in motivation
regulation.
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The neuroscientific model of motivational processes suggests
several educational implications which can be used to enhance
motivation to learn. For instance, reward is an essential dri-
ving force in the learning environment because approach behav-
ior would not occur without reward. To motivate the unmo-
tivated, the learning process should be rewarding and interest-
ing. Rewards do not have to be tangible ones. Reward in the
classroom can be any stimulus which has positive expected val-
ues, including positive feedback, praise, interesting activity, util-
ity, relevance, social support, and relatedness. It is important
to find out and make a list of appetitive stimuli including a
variety of compliments, enjoyable activities, interesting materi-
als, positive feedback, and diverse and novel learning context
which can activate the reward circuit of children and adoles-
cents. Since the repetition of the same compliment tends to
reduce positive RPE, it is desirable to introduce various reward
contingencies in an unexpected way in order to sustain the
motivation.
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To maintain motivation, the value a specific object and action
must be high enough to lead to an action selection. Because the
value is learned through trial and error, providing choices in
autonomous learning environments would be beneficial for stu-
dents to form and update their own value. This kind of choice
practice may eventually develop the brain regions related to val-
uation and decision-making. In case the motivation decreases,
the roles of attention and working memory cannot be more
important. Thus, it would be necessary to develop the train-
ing program for these executive functions and to examine its
effectiveness. Besides, creating a detailed goal hierarchy between
proximal and distal goals and developing specific action plans
will help students overcome the failure and temptation. Since
the motivational process model proposed in this paper is only
a provisional model, more research is required to verify its
validity.
Neuroeducation or educational neuroscience is the interdisci-
plinary research field which builds connection between education
and developmental, cognitive, emotional, or social neuroscience.
It aims at developing curriculums, learning strategies, teaching
methods, learning material, intervention programs to enhance
diverse types of learning and ultimately providing optimal learning
environments (Ansari et al., 2012; Kim, 2012). Since neuroed-
ucation is a relatively new academic field, the establishment of
systematic research paradigm along with intensive research is
expected to largely contribute to actual educational settings. With
accumulated research findings in the field of neuroeducation, a
great deal of progress is being made on the learning and devel-
opment of cognitive, emotional, and social skills. Nonetheless,
research on motivation definitely needs more attention. Neu-
roeducational research on motivation has advantages for under-
standing implicit and dynamic aspects of motivational processes
because observation and self-report reveal limitations. Choosing
a research topic which holds strong ecological validity in edu-
cational settings becomes crucial. In particular, more attention
should be paid to pragmatic research to enhance students’ moti-
vation to learn. For instance, if we can understand the neural
mechanisms underlying motivational phenomena such as inter-
est, curiosity, decision-making, addiction, risk-taking, and self-
regulation, we can develop a variety of interest-based learning
and instruction, curiosity-inducing textbooks, non-threatening
tests, and self-control training programs. The neurodevelopmen-
tal characteristics of children and adolescents should also be taken
into account to optimize the motivation-related brain functions.
The neuroeducational approach is also expected to contribute to
resolve controversial issues in existing motivation theories and
to propose creative theories of motivation beyond traditional
conventions.
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